Consciousness and liability of non-human intelligence
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.4013/rechtd.2022.143.06Resumo
The legal liability of non-human intelligence is a complicated matter that has concerned philosophers for a long time. Nevertheless, with the current advances in research and technology, the problem grows ever closer. This paper analyzes the legal desirability of assorting legal liability to a non-human intelligence. It argues that the question of the liability of such agents is defined, primarily, through the meeting of psychosomatic conditionals. Moreover, it poses that these conditionals are, partially, determined by consciousness. It concludes that to define whether legal liability is desirable or not one must set standards for non-human consciousness and, depending on the level of consciousness of that non-human intelligence, judge if the agent should be legally liable or not.
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