Issues for Lowe’s dualist view on agents

Beatriz Sorrentino Marques

Abstract


E.J. Lowe (2008) proposes a dualist conception of agents. He grounds his dualist view on the Unity Argument, which I claim relies on unwarranted presuppositions about the agent and, therefore, cannot support his view. This is a problem for Lowe’s account of actions as well, because his account relies on his dualist view of agents.

Keywords: Agents, dualism, mental states.


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