The final end of imagination : On the relationship between moral ideal and reflectivity in Immanuel Kant ’ s Critique of the Power of Judgment 1 O fim final da imaginação : sobre a relação entre ideal moral

One main quandary that emerges in the context of Immanuel Kant’s moral ideal, The Highest Good, is that on the one hand Kant sets it as a moral demand, that is, as a principle that must be comprehended as an attainable end for man in practice while, on the other hand, it is set as a moral ideal, i.e. as something that cannot be concretized and realized within the empirical world. The main goal of this paper is to argue for the realizability of the moral ideal by means of the principle of reflective judgment as a form of judgment that in fact clarifies human limitation. I assert that the very recognition of this limitation constitutes the possibility for hope in that ideal, or for striving towards it, and that this striving is the only way that the moral ideal can be concretized. I examine man’s recognition of self-limitation as a response to the moral demand to realize the moral ideal and the necessity of the power of imagination for this, used reflectively.


Introduction
One of the most puzzling terms in Immanuel Kant's pra ical philosophy is that of the Highest Good (henceforth: HG). 3 HG is discussed in a l three C itiques mutatis mutandis as the combination of hap iness (or worthiness to be hap y) and morality and is set as the ultimate end of human endeavor. 4One main quandary that emerges in this context is that, on the one hand, Kant sets the HG as a moral de and, that is, as a principle that must be comprehended as an attaina le end for man in pra ice while, on the other hand, it is set as a moral ideal, i.e. as something that cannot be concretized and realized within the empirical world.
The main goal of this paper is to ar ue for the realizability of HG by means of the principle of reflective judgment as a form of judgment that in fact clarifies human limitation.I assert that the very recognition of this limitation constitutes the possibility for hope in HG, or for striving towards it, and that this striving is the only way that HG can be concretized.I examine man's recognition of self-limitation as a response to the moral demand to realize HG, and the necessity of the power of imagination for this, used reflectively.I ar ue that precisely the reflective use of our imagination can, in pra ice, turn us into part of the ideal moral human community, as HG demands, 5 in spite of the fact that such a community cannot be realized in any concrete representation.
By "reflective use of imagination" , I refer to the way man recognizes his ability to reshape nature by means of culture.Culture demonstrates human striving to give teleological shape to nature as a whole, including to man himself as the ultimate end of nature in accordance with his cognitive powers.My emphasis wi l be on the manne in which man constructs himself as the ultimate end of nature by means of culture, which in fact re ulates him to think about his moral development towards HG while, at the same time, entailing recognition of human limitation precisely because it involves reflection on our need to set an ideal final moral end and to strive towards it as a natural human inclination.
I start with a general presentation to Kant's doctrine of reflective judgment and point out the distinct function the power of imagination has in it.Then I present the difference between ultimate end and final end, contending that in order for man to recognize himself as the final end of nature (namely, his moral vocation) he needs a form of reflective judgment.Next I demonstrate the sense in which culture, as an ultimate end of nature, constitutes the ground for the final end and thus re ulates man towards his moral duty to realize HG.Fina ly, I examine the recognition of the human need to give an ideal end to the entirety of human a ion as a basis for hope in the realizability of HG, and I point to the reflective use of imagination required for this.

Imagination and Reflective Judgment
In the fourth section of the introduction to the C itique of the Powe of Judgment (CJ) Kant distin uishes between two types of judgments and describes them as fo lows: If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) is given, then the power of judgment, which subsumes the particular under it […]  is determining.If, however, only the partic-e que essa luta é a única maneira de concretizar o ideal moral.Examino o reconhecimento do homem da auto-limitação como uma resposta à demanda moral para realizar o ideal moral e a necessidade do poder da imaginação para isso, usado de forma reflexiva.
Palavras-chave: cultura, fim final, bem supremo, esperança, imaginação, Kant, juízo moral reflexivo ideal, fim último. 3The concept of "HG" (Summum Bonum) appears in all three Critiques and in many of Kant's post-critical writings, mainly on history and religion.The multiple contexts in which Kant discusses this concept are often incompatible with one another and it is not clear whether it maintains the same significance at all times.For instance, in the Critique of Practical Reason Kant distinguishes between the "Supreme Good" (das höchste Gut) and "HG" (das oberste Gut) and argues that while the latter in itself is a condition for happiness, only the combination of both provides the complete understanding of the moral ideal as a Supreme Good.I will not go into the depth of Kant's linguistic distinctions regarding HG in the present paper.Instead, I relate to it in its basic definition as the ultimate object or end of practical reason, i.e. as the combination of complete happiness and complete moral virtue.What interests me is not a logical or theoretical analyzation of HG, but the practical question of its realizability.For a detailed account of HG see: Engstrom (1992, p. 747-780). 4See for example: Kant (2000, CP, A810-811/B838-839, A813-814/B841-842); Kant (2002b, CPR, 5:107-141); Kant (2002a, CJ, 5:429-436, 442-453). 5The ideal community I refer to here as implied from HG is different from the idea of "the kingdom of ends" that Kant presents in the 'Second Critique' (Kant, 2002b, CPR, 5:108) and in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant, 1997, G, 4:439).For the kingdom of ends refers to morality alone detached from any natural inclination such as happiness.While HG indicates an ideal world where "Happiness […] [is] in exact proportion with the morality of the rational beings who are thereby rendered worthy of it" (Kant, 2000, CP, A814/B842).I will argue that this ideal community is entwined with the idea of culture as presented in the 'Third Critique'.ular is given, for which the universal is to be found, then the power of judgment is merely reflecting (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 5:179).
Kant discusses the determining power of judgment mainly in the C itique of Pure Reason (CP A/B).There he examines the transcendental conditions of our ability to make judgments on empirical objects of experience, that is, how we subsume empirical sense data under general a priori concepts.However, in the C itique of the Powe of Judgment Kant raises a different unique sense of judgment: the reflecting power of judgment.Here, our judgment begins with a given particular and only then looks to give it a rule.In other words, instead of ap lying a determinate a priori concept to a particular case given in experience, in reflective judgments we should infer from the ecific given case itself the rule that this case is supposed to represent.
Accordingly, the end of the judgment also varies.While determining judgments seek to determine the empirical object under conceptual rules of the understanding, the purpose of reflective judgments is "to ground the unity of a l empirical principles under equa ly empirical but higher principles" (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 5:180).Stated differently, reflective judgments seek to bring the systematic order given in experience towa ds a concept, and not the other way around as in determining judgments.The point is that the act of reflective judgment itself generates the rule according to which it is sup osed to operate.In order for it to do this, Kant states that the power of reflective judgment must assume a ecial kind of concept that wi l serve as a uiding principle for the judgment: "the purposiveness of nature" [die Zwec mäßigkeit de Natu ].
Stated very genera ly, Kant asserts that reflective judgments are involved in certain requirements that are necessary to the way e reflect about nature.Hence, the principle of "the purposiveness of nature" becomes the condition for the correlation between human judgments on nature and nature itself.It transpires that we are not refer ing here to an actual reacha le purpose or end but to reflective judgment itself as the power to comprehend the pos ibility of an end in general.Put differently, when judging reflectively we must comprehend nature through the principle of "the purposiveness of nature" in order for the judgment to be implemented.However, because this principle is not based on our objective experience in nature, as noted, its status is subjecti e.It fo lows that reflective judgments refer to the ability of the subject to give a rule to herself through the ap lication of her reflection on nature. 6The point is that although this rule is subjective it nevertheless stands as a necessary assumption that constructs the manne in which we must judge nature in order for it to conform with our faculties of cognition.
Here is where the power of imagination comes into view: instead of serving as a mediator between sensibility and the understanding, as it does in determining judgments, in reflective judgments imagination provides a sensi le representation of the subject's state of mind while performing the judgment.In other words, while in determining judgments imagination provides a representation related to an object that leads to a determination of that object, in reflective judgments the representation given by imagination is determining the subject and her feeling in the act of judging (Kant, 2002a, CJ, First  Introduction, 20:223).Put differently, instead of providing us with objective representation, imagination in reflective judgment gives us a mental representation of the manne in which we are a le to make judgments in the first place. 7his representation is unique because it does not present any ecific content in intuition; instead it presents only the for according to which we perform judgments: the form of purposi enes .Therefore, in order to assume that nature is indeed organized in a way that is compati le with our cognition, we must be a le to represent in our imagination a principle of pure purposiveness, i.e., purposiveness as a mode or form of a ivity, through which we can reorganize nature and ap ly general concepts to it. 8or the purpose of the present article, pointing to the involvement of imagination in the principle of "the purposiveness of nature" helps to emphasize the reflective a ect of judgment as an a ivity that relates to how we represent the conditions of our possibility of thinking both nature as purposive and ourselves as its ultimate end.The main point I would like to ar ue is that through the ability to think nature purposively a space is opened for us to think also our moral purposes, such as HG, as pra ica ly possi le.I wish now to elaborate on the relationship between natural and moral purposiveness.In particular, I would like to dwe l on the connection between ultimate and final end in the teleological nexus in which they ap ear in the second part of the 'Third Critique' .

Ultimate End and Final End
Unlike the C itique of Pra ical Reason (CPR), where Kant discusses the moral ideal of HG regarding the individual, the discussion of HG in the C itique of the Powe of Judgment relates to humanity as a hole.The emphasis is on the fact that, while from a purely pra ical per ective man is described as an end-in-itself and, consequently, as being a finite end apart from nature, the per ective of reflective judgment proposed in the 'Third Critique' i lustrates the way that human purposiveness can be fu ly connected with the purposiveness of nature.
The connection between the principle of purposiveness and reflective judgment finds its clearest articulation in the second part of the 'Third Critique' , "the Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment" .Here, Kant no longer discusses the idea of purposiveness without an end, as he did in the first part, "the Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment" .Rather, he focusses on the purposiveness of nature as a real objecti e end (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 5:194).9Let us reca l that the idea of purposiveness without an end is a key principle of aesthetic judgment in that it constitutes an essential premise regarding the existence of systematicity in nature in order for us to be a le to judge it. 10The point is that, in spite of being an es ential premise its status remains subjective, as stated earlier, and therefore Kant connects it to judgments of taste.In contrast, teleological judgments, although they too belong to a form of reflecti e judgment, generate assertions regarding the objecti e purposiveness of nature, namely, regarding objects that we necessarily judge as purposeful and consequently are no longer connected to taste but rather to the concepts of understanding and reason.
Kant asserts that certain natural processes can only be fu ly understood when, in a dition to an explanation grounded on purely mechanical causality, they are also described in terms of purposiveness.11Stated differently, Kant points out that the explanations by which we determine things in nature on the basis of our theoretical reason are in need of complementation by means of reflective judgments that also relate to the purposes of these things.This complementation is manife ed in the teleological principle of natural purposiveness. 12n his "Ap endix to Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment" , Kant presents two separate ends of nature, 'ultimate end' [letzte Zwec ] and 'final end' [Endzwec ].The first refers to the highest end of nature and is conditional on other ends that preceded it, while the second refers to an end "which needs no other [end] as a condition of its possibility" , and refers to the moral end (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 5:434).Kant develops the idea of an 'ultimate end' by a dressing the objective purposiveness of nature as a syste of ends.The emphasis is on the ability to grasp nature as purposively organized as an ability that is unique to man.For us to be a le to grasp how the mechanical mode of operation of the laws of nature works in harmony with the essential order of the phenomena of nature as e human beings grasp them, we must assume that nature has an underlying holistic structure, as if a l of nature were organized "in accordance with final causes" (Kant, 2002a, CJ,  5:434).In other words, for us to be a le to grasp the diverse natural mechanical processes occur ing in nature in accordance with the way that we think of the organisms in it, we must assume the concept of 'end' . 13That is the only way we can grasp nature, "given" , in Kant's words, "the nature of our understanding and our reason" (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 5:434).
It is important to stress here that in assuming a natural purposiveness we are not imposing a transcendental interpretation on nature, as though there were a real re ulative purpose beyond it.Rather, we are ta king of a necessary methodological premise that a lows us to reflect on nature as an object of knowledge.That is, we are ta king of a principle of reflective judgment (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 5:429).Man is set as the ultimate end of nature.Kant explains this by the assertion that man "is the only being on earth who forms a concept of ends for himself and who by means of his reason can make a system of ends out of an a gregate of purposively formed things" (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 5:426-7).Kant asserts that only man can refer to nature as a system because it is only he who provides the foundation around which that system can be created in the first place.That is to say, since man is the only organism in nature who raises the question of the purposiveness of its other organisms and who can use them as means for his own ends, this leads man to reflection on nature as a whole system whose apex is he himself.Therefore, it follows that the purposiveness of nature as a system entails an insepara le connection with the purposiveness of man, given that the very ability of man to think and to direct his behavior purposively constitutes the condition for his being the ultimate end of nature.
However, although man constitutes the ultimate end of nature, he cannot, for a l that, also serve as a final end of the existence of that very nature in the literal sense of the word.The main reason for this lies in the fact that man is a natu-ral being and consequently is conditioned, while, as we saw earlier, the main chara eristic of the final end is that it is unconditioned.In other words, the final end is, by its very definition, absolute and total, and therefore cannot be embodied in nature or in a natural being, such as man.Moreover, the systematicity of nature per se does not give its existence any meaning, and therefore man, as the last link in the purposiveness of nature, cannot simultaneously constitute the validation of that same nature.Yet Kant gives man a key role as an ultimate end of nature towa ds the final end.For precisely human ability to grasp ourselves as the ultimate end of nature leads us to think about its final end: As the sole being on earth who has reason, and thus a capacity to set voluntary ends for himself, he is certainly the titular lord of nature, and, if nature is regarded as a teleological system, then it is his vocation to be the ultimate end of nature; but always only conditionally, that is, subject to the condition that he has the understanding and the will to give to nature and to himself a relation to an end that can be sufficient for itself independently of nature, which can thus be a final end, which, however, must not be sought in nature at all (Kant, 2002a,  CJ, 5:431).
The explanation lies in the assertion that only when we think about ourselves reflecti ely, by giving ourselves the principle of purposiveness, do we have the possibility to reflect on nature and to think of it, too, in terms of a system of ends.Kant stresses the fact that this reflection necessarily leads beyond that purposive system of nature.For it is only in light of a higher end than nature, to which nature is subordinate, that we can give that nature teleological meaning and identify ourselves as the ultimate link in its chain.Stated differently, it emerges that the ultimate end of nature in fact pre ares the ground for the realization of its final end.
Kant clarifies this by asserting that the role of the ultimate end is "to prepare [man] for what he himself must do in order to be a final end" (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 5:431).That is, the idea of man as the ultimate end of nature contains an additional idea, namely, that the final purpose of man is to free himself from nature and to act according to a purely rational motive: the moral principle.It should be noted that Kant does not maintain that man as he is given in the present constitutes the final end.Rather, he is refer ing to a future situation preparing man "for what he himself must do" (Kant, 2002a,  CJ, 5:431, emphasis mine).In other words, man in his present natural state can serve solely as an ultimate end of nature.In order for him to also be its final end he must act "under moral laws" (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 5:448-9), as Kant asserts fur-ther on in reference to the ideal of HG that human reason imposes, as noted, as a final end on nature as a whole.The point is that, as long as man is viewed as a rational being who can act according to moral principles independently of nature, he does not count only as part of conditioned nature.
I would like to a dress man's freedom to act independently of nature from two different yet interconnected per ectives.One is the pra ical per ective, which sets the idea of culture as an ultimate end that constitutes the ground for the final end.For culture a lows man to shape nature itself as an end according to the ends that he freely sets on himself.The second per ective is that of the moral ideal, which seeks to examine what man can and must do as a rational being, a ing independently of nature in order to reshape nature as a moral system.I wi l now examine these two per ectives and wi l pose the question: how can the idea of culture as the ultimate end of natural order direct man towards the moral ideal of HG?

Culture and Moral Ideal
Kant describes culture as man's ability in general to set ends for himself.I previously noted that man cannot serve as an ultimate end of nature if he is not capa le of simultaneously directing nature towards its final end.This means that man must direct his own existence purposively by freely determining his a ions.Culture is the tool that assists him in this, because it does not describe any ecific goal or end.Rather, it a lows man to freely direct his a ions, by a lowing him "to feel an aptitude for higher ends, which lie hi den in us" (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 5:434).Kant distin uishes here between culture and hap iness as two natural ends of man and asserts that while hap iness "is the matte of a l of [man's] ends on earth" (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 5:431),14 culture constitutes the fomal condition for man to freely set ends for himself, that is, to use nature without being dependent on it.
In fact, Kant sets culture as a natural end from a general teleological per ective, that is, as an end whose role it is to allow men in general to think about their moral development, both as individuals and as part of the human community, by developing their ability, as said, to set themselves ends that are not conditional on nature.' Ability' here refers to man's power to structure himself as an ultimate end of nature by means of culture."But" , says Kant, "not every kind of culture is adequate for this ultimate aim of nature" (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 5:431).In fact, Kant seeks to point to an inner division that the term 'culture' requires and, to this end, distin uishes between what he terms "culture of ski l" [Gesc ic lic keit] and what he terms "culture of discipline" [Kultu de Zuc t] (Kant, 2002a, CJ,  5:431-432).The former refers to the way man structures his external sur oundings materia ly, that is, to the way he devel-ops means to satisfy his desires in order to increase his hap iness and we l-being (the term 'culture' is here used in the basic sense that we today ascribe to it).The latter, in contrast, does not refer to systems that man imposes on the external world.Rather, it refers to that which develops the internal freedom of man, namely, the manne in which he sets ends for himself on the basis of reason alone.
The main point here is that, in order to develop our humanity according to the ends of reason, we must develop the two kinds of culture -of ski l and of discipline -simultaneously.This is because the first is responsi le for promoting our end-setting in general as natural beings, while the role of the second is to perfect and refine these natural ends according to the ends required by reason.Stated differently, culture as a whole gradua ly separates man from his immediate ends, which are influenced, among other things, by his sensual nature, in order to make "room for the development of humanity" (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 5:433).It can be said that culture creates a kind of human who is capa le of contro ling her natural impulses and desires, on the one hand, while, on the other, simultaneously developing new kind of desires that are defined by culture itself.In other words, culture helps man to free himself from dependency on ends dictated to him by his sensual nature while a lowing him to set new highe ends within the boundaries of that culture.Kant goes on to assert: Beautiful arts and sciences […] make human beings, if not morally better, at least better mannered for society, very much reduce the tyranny of sensible tendencies, and prepare humans for a sovereignty in which reason alone shall have power (Kant, 2002a, CJ,  5:433).
It is important to note that culture in itself (see: "beautiful arts and sciences") does not represent the moral vocation of man.At the same time, Kant emphasizes that, without culture, man would not have the ability to free himself from the heteronomy of his natural inclinations and to independently set ends for himself.
The question arises: if nature in itself cannot lead man to the moral end, but only to culture as an ultimate end of nature, how can we continue to imagine the final end from this position?Put differently, how can man bridge the gap between culture as the ultimate end of nature and the final end as the moral ideal of HG?I would like to su gest that the answer to this question finds expression in the for of reflective judgment.By this I mean the way man reshapes nature by set-ting ends, a beit not by dogmatica ly defining ends in nature by way of determinative judgments but, rather, by means of his ability to think c itically, by using reflection, about the way he himself sets ends in nature. 15ant asserts that, although the ends that culture sets are also connected with nature, much like determinative judgments that set objects in nature, thereby ena ling it, the ends that culture sets do not derive directly from nature.In other words, culture is not a condition that constitutes experience.Rather, it has the for of a re ulative principle, "a uide for the power of judgment in reflection on the products of nature" (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 5:399).The fact that culture serves as a demonstration of a re ulative principle is reflected in the way nature re ulates the subject to make judgments that are essential for beings like him, that is, natural beings endowed with reason who seek to give their a ions meaning.This means that culture uncovers something essential in the nature of man that does not find expression when he acts according to his sensual nature alone, namely, the human need to give teleological form to nature as a whole, including to man himself as an ultimate end of nature "ap ropriate to our cognitive faculties" (Kant, 2002a, CJ, 5:399).The main point here is not the revelation of an internal purposiveness in nature itself but, rather, the self-awarenes of the human striving to systematize nature.It emerges that the ay we recognize ourselves as possessing moral ability, that is, as having the aspiration to realize HG, is conditional on our recognition of ourselves as cultural beings, namely, on self-awareness of our potential to promote our ability to freely set ends in nature.
It is important to note that I do not mean to assert that the ideal of the HG can be positively portrayed in this manner as a concrete moral goal.Rather, my assertion is that the development of our abilities by means of culture ena les us to recognize ourselves as possessing moral ability within our limited existence in nature.It fo lows that cultural pra ice itself (through the ability to freely set ends) creates in us the need to raise the question of the moral ideal and whether we have reason to hope that it can indeed be realized within the empirical world.
In the final section I wi l examine that human need to provide a highest moral ideal end as a need that points to human limitation, rather than to an ability to ar ive at that final end in pra ice, while ar uing that the recognition of that limitation is the ground for hope in the moral ideal. 16y point is that this recognition is involved in our reflective use of imagination, which provides man with a self-re resentation that presents both human limitation as a need to give teleological form to nature as a whole and human moral ability as the capacity to freely set ends for ourselves, the capacity for culture for that matter, as a form of a ivity that reshapes nature.I wish to ar ue that this dual self-representation inevita ly leads to reflection on the actual human condition vis-àvis the perfect human moral condition, i.e.HG, which in turn demonstrates its realizability through a structure of hope.

Limitation as a Ground for Hope
Kant describes man' s need for a highest end, one that combines a l his other ends as a whole under one principle, as a necessary outcome of the limitation of human pra ical reason.In Religion within the Bounda ies of Mere Reason (Rel.) he writes: [The idea of HG] meets our natural need, which would otherwise be a hindrance to moral resolve, to think for all our doings and nondoings taken as a whole some sort of final end […] it is one of the inescapable limitations of human beings and of their practical faculty of reason […] to be concerned in every action with its result, seeking something in it that might serve them as an end (Kant, 1998, Rel., 6:5-7n, emphases mine).
Kant asserts that all rational human a ivity, without exception, is intrinsica ly directed towards systematic progress and the creation of totality.In other words, even when the absolute condition of the wi l is fulfi led, reason demands, a l the same, to generalize a l of man's a ions towards one highest end: HG. 17 Kant ca ls this human need for totality "one of the inescapa le limitations of human beings" (Kant, 1998, Rel.,  6:5-7n), in the sense that it is a neces ary limitation of human pra ical reason.Kant's ar ument is that man is a goal-directed-being by his very nature and, therefore, inevita ly directs himself to the question regarding the final end of his conduct.This does not mean that HG constitutes the moral moti e but, rather, that human beings necessarily imagine its possibility when they commit themselves to an a ion on moral grounds.As noted above, this does not refer to the ability to provide any material embodiment to HG but, rather, to the possibility to give it meaning as a re ulative idea that can be used as a uide for a ion. 18wo main, interconnected matters arise here.The first relates to the human need to direct a l a ions as a whole towards one ideal end, while the second relates to the need to grant objective reality to that ideal end in order to be a le to act according to it in pra ice.These two matters simultaneously point to, on the one hand, the limitations of human nature -due to the very need to set an ideal end in the first place -and, on the other, man' s recognition of these limitations, with this very recognition constituting the ground for hope in that final end as a real possibility.The question that arises is: Why is it precisely man' s recognition of self-limitation in empirical nature that opens up the possibility to think of a moral ideal that goes beyond everything that can be recognized or known empirica ly?And, further, how can that moral ideal be justified at the pra ical level of human a ions?The answer I propose relies, as stated, on the principles of reflective judgment as a form of judgment that does not determine HG but, rather, demonstrates that it can only have meaning with regard to the purposeful ap lication of man' s subjective cognitive abilities. 19ant contends that human understanding is of a ecial kind, since it a lows us to relate to organisms in nature as though they stem from a representation of ends, by means of which we make the unifying lawfulness of nature possile. 20The main point is that this is not a matter of a mere eculative option; rather, the discursive structure of our mind compels us to think of the totality of nature by means of this form of systematic representation, where the whole constitutes the end of its parts.In other words, due to the discursivity of our understanding, we are una le to think of nature othe than by means of teleological principles. 2117 See: "Pure reason, whether considered in its speculative or in its practical use, always […] demands the absolute totality of conditions for a given conditioned.[…] it seeks the unconditioned totality of the object of pure practical reason, under the name of the highest good" (Kant, 2002b, CPR, 5:107). 18A similar idea can be found in Yirmiahu Yovel's interpretation of HG as a regulatory idea of history.According to Yovel, HG does not point to a transcendental world that is beyond the empirical world.Rather, it indicates two states of affairs of the same world: one that is given and another that is ideal.According to this interpretation, HG becomes the end of the world from the perspective of human history, since it is the perfect state of reality in which people actually live and act (Yovel, 1980, p. 29-80, 158-200).I share with Yovel the motivation to give HG moral meaning within the empirical space of human activities.My addition is the prominence of both imagination and reflection. 19Cf.Kneller (2009, p. 50-52).Jane Kneller presents a similar interpretation yet from the opposite direction.She argues that our moral imperative to realize HG in practice already assumes that we have the ability to imagine that such realization is possible and that it is possible within our cognitive abilities. 20See Kant's (2002a) discussion in CJ, sections § § 76-77 21 Here the issue of limitation arises from another perspective by raising the possibility of an understanding that is different from ours, i.e. an intuitive understanding that does not have the need for the concept of purposiveness since it does not distinguish between reality and possibility, and therefore is only an idea.It is important to note that Kant does not claim that this "different understanding" exists, but that the discursive nature of our cognition imposes upon us both the idea of "different understanding" and of thinking in terms of natural purposiveness as two essential methodological assumptions that involve one another.In other words, in order to understand the concept of natural purposiveness as derived from our limited discursive understanding (it is limited because it must think of nature in terms of purposiveness) we need only the possibility of non-discursive understanding (i.e., God), that is, an ideal one.I will not go into this argument here as it requires independent discussion.For further discussion, see Beiser (2006).
HG emerges, too, as an essential presup osition that fo lows, as noted, from the human need to set a final moral end that comprehends the totality of a ions in pra ice.Human limitation, in this re ect, is demonstrated in pra ice in man's ability to use his reason by reflecting on that limitation.Kant ar ues that man must ask himself in what manner his reason can be used without setting ends, and his conclusion is that without a purposive structure no use can be made of reason (neither pra ical nor theoretical).
With this in mind, and returning to the idea of culture as an ultimate end of man that prepares him "for what he himself must do in order to be a final end" (Kant, 2002a,  CJ, 5:431), it can be said that culture involves recognition of human limitation precisely because it entails reflection on a representation of the structure of human progress towards an ideal final end as a natural human desire.Put differently, my claim is that HG is not something that can be represented in intuition as any other pra ical end that we might pose to ourselves.Rather, it is something that can only be portrayed in thought as having the for of an end and it is articulated through culture as the human ability to freely set ends in nature.Now, because HG is a moral end, man is o liged to strive to realize it despite, as stated above, his inability to represent it intuitively.It is here, I would like to ar ue, that the reflective use of imagination takes place.
It should be stressed here that I am not pointing at any direct representation that we create in our imagination, in the sense of the ability to give embodiment or realization to HG.Rather, I am ta king of the reflective use of imagination, which gives us a criterion solely for a reflecti e as es ment of how close, or how far, we are to, or from, realizing that ideal.It emerges that our very st i ing towards HG as a final end points to our human limitation with regard to it, on the one hand, while, on the other, the representation of this unavoida le self-limitation that we create in our imagination ena les us to give an articulation to that striving in the form of the gap between us and that final end.
It fo lows that our very recognition of human limitation points to the fact that there wi l always be a gap between our present state and HG.This gap is a necessary chara eristic of the manne in which human beings think of HG as an ideal final moral end.Consequently, given the fact that the moral ideal cannot be fu ly realized in human life and yet we have a moral duty to promote it, the only way of concretizing it is through our recognition of self-limitation as constituting the ground for striving for that ideal.In other words, recognition of human limitation is the preliminary condition for human freedom to set ourselves a tota ly rational moral ideal within the empirical world and to re-re ulate our a ions according to it as a real pos ibility, in spite of our awareness of the fact that we wi l never be a le to completely attain that moral ideal in our present life. 22he conclusion I want to point to, in this re ect, is that the hope in the possibility of realizing HG is demonstrated through the ay that we choose to assume it, in contrast to the thing that we assume.The emphasis is on the way we choose to see ourselves as mora ly capa le beings.It can be asserted that we are in need of a form of judgment that clarifies the recognition of our limitation as beings who also act according to natural desires and inclinations, in order to create the basis for hope in our rational abilities to act according to pra ical reason.I am refer ing, as noted, to the form of reflective judgment that is not directed to determining the object, that is to say, I am not ta king of the possibility of knowing or recognizing the moral ideal as a substantial end but, rather, of the ability of the subject to presup ose it as a rational principle according to which it is possi le to act.In other words, the sense in which I wish to e a lish the connection between the principle of reflective judgment and the moral ideal is in the idea that through the structure of purposiveness, or the ability to think nature teleologica ly, one can think of the moral ideal too as a pra ical possibility.
In conclusion, it can be said that although HG cannot be realized in pra ice, the hope in its possibility remains an essential condition for our ability to act in light of that ideal in the empirical world.This is as part of man's recognition of himself as an ultimate end of nature who possesses the possibility of freely setting himself ends in that nature.I wish to point to the fact that this possibility is involved in the reflective use of imagination, clarifying man's recognition of his limitation while simultaneously a lowing him to imagine himself in a manner that extends his given transcendental conditions, in so far as reflection presents man's abilities to re ulate his conduct also according to his pra ical reason and therefore constitutes a ground for hope. 23This use of imagination sets the ultimate end of nature as part of the general final end, thereby meeting the need to sup ly cultural and teleological explanations of ourselves as striving towards this final end, even if, as stated, this end cannot be positively imagined.